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Summary
The U.S. Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coastal states, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Island are exposed to relatively high levels of risk from hurricanes
and tropical storms.  The rapid expansion of the U.S. population into areas that are
susceptible to hurricanes has placed millions of people and new areas of  economic
activity in harm’s way.  To address the financial and economic effects of such risks,
households and businesses have relied on private insurance, state-sponsored
insurance pools, and/or federal emergency disaster assistance to manage their natural
hazard risk.
In the aftermath of four major hurricanes in 2004 — Charley, Ivan, Frances, and
Jeanne — that resulted in tens of billions of dollars in insured and uninsured property
losses, the 109th Congress might focus attention on the long-term budgetary
implications of disaster recovery expenses incurred by the federal government, and
finding ways to expand private-sector capacity for insuring disaster losses.  Previous
Congresses responded to insurers’ concerns by considering legislation to create a
federal catastrophe reinsurance program for residential property.
Given that actual and threatened catastrophe losses to property in hurricane-
prone states have caused insurers to be unwilling or unable to provide property
insurance coverage to the extent sought and needed, the federal government has
created a federal flood insurance program and the states have created short-term risk
financing solutions for the small-to-moderate sized hurricane.  Most economists
would agree that it is in the interest of both the federal and state governments to
assure that property is insured so as to facilitate the remediation, reconstruction, and
replacement of damaged or destroyed property in order to reduce or avoid the
negative effects to the national and state economies, and to the revenues of the state
and local governments needed to provide for the public welfare.
Insurers, legislators and policymakers learned a great deal from Hurricane
Andrew in 1992 and took specific actions that had the effect of minimizing the
impact of last season’s devastating hurricanes that made landfall.  One outcome of
these changes was that states have shifted the burden of hurricane losses to
households through hurricane deductibles, policyholder assessments to repay revenue
bond debt, and other insurance underwriting requirements. 
This report examines the role of insurance in financing disaster risk and the
changes implemented by insurers and legislators that helped to minimize market
disruptions following the 2004 hurricane season.  After reviewing the congressional
interest in financing catastrophe risk and summarizing the results of the 2004
hurricane season, the report describes lessons learned, the insurance market’s
response to hurricanes, and existing mechanisms for insuring hurricane losses.  The
concluding two sections analyze issue and policy options as well as future challenges
that policymakers in the 109th Congress face.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia.
2 Hurricanes are formed in the North Atlantic, Caribbean Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and the
Pacific Coast of Mexico.  The greatest likelihood of a hurricane striking land areas is along
the Gulf Coast and the Southeastern Seaboard, as well as Hawaii. Some hurricanes have
struck central Pennsylvania and the coast of New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and New
England.
3  Rachel A. Davidson, and Kelly B. Lambert, “Comparing the Hurricane Disaster Risk of
U.S. Coastal Counties,” Natural Hazards Review, August 2001, p. 132.
Hurricanes and Disaster Risk Financing
Through Insurance: Challenges 
and Policy Options
Introduction
The eighteen states along the U.S. Gulf and Atlantic coast,1 extending from
Texas to Maine, along with Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, are at
relatively high risk from hurricanes and tropical storms.2  Hurricanes and tropical
storms typically produce violent winds, heavy rains, and storm surges that result in
flooding, coastal erosion, and ecological damage.  When they strike in populated,
commercial, or industrial areas, hurricanes and tropical storms can cause dozens of
deaths and billions of dollars in both direct costs (e.g., loss of capital stock and
investments) and indirect costs (e.g., disruption of economic activity, including loss
of income, employment and services).3
Hurricanes are normally described as being in one of five categories, depending
on their wind velocity.  Category one hurricanes have winds of 74 to 95 miles per
hour, category two hurricanes have winds of 96 to 110 miles per hour, category three
hurricanes have winds of 111 to 130 miles per hour, category four hurricanes have
winds of 131 to 155 miles per hour, and category five hurricanes have winds greater
than 155 miles per hour.
Lessons learned from the four major hurricanes in 2004 — Charley (category
4 at its peak) , Ivan (Category 5 at its peak), Frances (category 4 at its peak) and
Jeanne (category 3 at its peak) — might lead the 109th Congress to focus attention on
the mounting cost of federal outlays for disaster assistance involving hurricanes, and
deciding whether and how the federal government could improve the nation’s ability
to finance the losses created by these events.  Insurers, legislators and policymakers
learned a great deal from the devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew in 1992,
especially in the areas of pre-disaster mitigation and the financing of catastrophic
CRS-2
risk, and actions they took served to minimize market disruption following the
devastating 2004 hurricane season.  However, the short-term insurance solutions
designed to finance loss caused by a small (category one) or moderate hurricane
(category two, three or four) will not work for a catastrophic hurricane (category five)
because state pools lack the financial capacity for financing events of such
magnitude. 
Prior to the beginning of the 109th Congress, some Members of Congress had
begun to rethink federal disaster policy, particularly with respect to the financing of
catastrophic risk and the unwillingness or inability of insurers to provide property
insurance coverage to the extent sought and needed.  An important issue these
Members grappled with was deciding how to reconcile the possible roles for the
public and private sectors in disaster risk financing and risk reduction.  Several
questions arose: What has been the experience of using financial tools, such as
insurance and other financial services, to reduce disaster risk?  What challenges and
opportunities exist for disaster risk transfer and risk reduction schemes?  And lastly,
what concrete steps must be taken, and by whom, to form partnerships between the
public and private sectors to use insurance and other financial services for disaster
risk reduction?
In preparation for debate on financing disaster risks in the 109th Congress, this
report examines the role of insurance in financing disaster risk and the changes
implemented by insurers and state legislators that helped to minimize market
disruptions following the 2004 hurricane season.  After reviewing the congressional
interest in financing catastrophe risk and summarizing the results of the 2004
hurricane season, the next three sections describe lessons learned, insurance market’s
response to hurricanes, and existing mechanisms for insuring hurricane losses.  The
concluding sections analyze issues and policy options as well as future challenges
that policymakers in the 109th Congress face.
Catastrophic Risk Financing With Insurance
Individuals and policymakers have two options to reduce losses from disasters:
pre-disaster mitigation that reduces physical /environmental vulnerabilities and risk
financing designed to reduce financial vulnerabilities.  The first step in the disaster
management framework is to mitigate damages from disasters.  The residual
economic risk can then be managed with risk financing strategies.  Financing is thus
an integral part of managing disaster risk; it would not be feasible to quickly
reconstruct the damaged property and infrastructure, and also to restore the livelihood
of the affected persons without adequate financial arrangements. 
Insurance is the primary method of financing natural disaster risk in the U.S..
Risk financing with insurance avoids the time lag that is associated with post-disaster
assistance or financing.  Insurers are able to assess damages and reimburse losses
immediately.  In providing insurance coverage, an insurer will agree to assume a
portion of the policyholder’s disaster risk exposure in exchange for a premium.  From
this premium payment, the insurer sets aside loss reserves to pay expected claims and
build up capital reserves to “buffer” against the risk of insurer insolvency from low-
probability, high-cost events.  Insurance companies supplement this arrangement by
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4 Reinsurance is a form of  insurance for an insurance company that provides considerable
protection to the primary insurer by: (1) limiting that insurer’s loss exposure to levels
commensurate with their net assets; (2) reducing the wide swings in profit and loss margins
inherent to the insurance business; (3) protecting against catastrophic loss; and (4)
increasing capacity or the dollar amount of risk an insurer can prudently assume, based on
its surplus and the nature of the business written.
5 David J. Cummins, Neil A. Doherty and Anita Lo, “Can Insurers Pay for the ‘Big One’?
Measuring the Capacity of an Insurance Market to Respond to Catastrophic Losses,”
Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 26, no. 2, p. 557.
6 Policyholders surplus refers to “net worth” or “owners’ equity” in other industries.  It is
a measure of the capacity of insurers to underwrite policies, and it must increase to meet the
demands of a growing U.S. economy and claims resulting from hurricanes and other natural
hazards.
7 Ross J. Davidson Jr., “Working Toward a Comprehensive National Strategy for Funding
Catastrophe Exposures,” Journal of Insurance Regulation, vol. 7, no. 2, Winter 1998, p.
134.
purchasing reinsurance from a reinsurance company so that losses from a
catastrophic event are spread worldwide.4
Most insurance experts agree that although insurers and traditional reinsurers
could absorb the loss shock from a moderate (category two, three and four) hurricane
(e.g., less than $50 billion in insured losses), their financial capacity may not be
adequate to cope with a catastrophic (category five) hurricane.  Estimates of the
probable maximum losses (PMLs) from a catastrophic hurricane striking the U.S.
range up to $100 billion, and this figure could be even higher depending on the
location, time and intensity of the event.  The PML loss from a Category 5 hurricane
directly hitting a densely populated area along the Gulf and Atlantic Coast (e.g., the
Miami-Ft. Lauderdale area) could exceed the total capacity (policyholder surplus) of
the U.S. insurance industry.5  The policyholders surplus of the entire property and
casualty insurance industry stood at about $370 billion at the end of 2004.6  Only a
fraction of this industry-wide total surplus amount would be available to compensate
victims of a hurricane.  Insurers must rely on this same limited pool of capital to pay
for other potentially catastrophic and unpredictable risks, such as terrorism, mold,
and medical malpractice and asbestos liability claims.  Insurers may have to liquidate
bonds and other financial assets in order to pay claims, triggering an adverse impact
on U.S. financial markets.7
Congressional Interest In Financing 
Catastrophic Risk
America’s coastal areas are under increasing pressure from population growth
and property development in areas that are inherently susceptible to hurricane
hazards.  The nation realizes this risk when hurricanes strike and communities suffer,
while American taxpayers, through the federal government, bear the costs associated
with indemnifying uninsured victims of natural disasters and rebuilding critical
infrastructure.
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8 The high long-run costs and low demand for disaster insurance results from insurers having
to hold huge amounts of capital to pay claims resulting from rare but potentially large
catastrophe losses, and the limited willingness of many consumers to pay risk-based
premiums for disaster insurance, respectively. 
Table 1 shows that while the frequency of catastrophic events in the last few
years is less compared with earlier years, insured losses have increased significantly.
The increasing magnitude of both insured and uninsured losses from natural disasters
represent an ongoing challenge for governments and the private sector.  Catastrophes
result in large government outlays for disaster assistance and they place a financial
strain on private disaster insurance markets.  The federal government alone, facing
fiscal constraints to cover the losses to the private  sector, will find it challenging to
meet long-term disaster-related spending.  Further, insurers have been and will
continue to be reluctant to cover properties in high-risk areas because of high long-
run costs (which translates into high prices for disaster insurance) and low demand
for disaster insurance.8  To make insurance available and affordable, state
governments have created state pools to provide catastrophe insurance or reinsurance
coverage at subsidized rates.
Table 1. Total U.S. Insured Losses and Federal Outlays for
Uninsured Losses from Major Disasters: 1995-2004a
($ millions)
Year



















1995 34 2.7 $8,310 $10,033 $4,235 $2,492
1996 41 3.9 7,375 8,649 4,042 2,581
1997 25 1.6 2,600 2,981 5,248 2,898
1998 37 3.5 10,070 11,367 2,155 2,242
1999 27 3.3 8,321 9,190 2,597 4,149
2000 24 1.4 4,600 4,915 3,019 2,853
2001 20 1.6 26,548 27,582 6,249 3,413
2002 25 1.8 5,850 5,932 12,677 4,114
2003 21 2.6 12,885 12,885 2,255 8,761
2004 22 3.4 27,275 NA 2,068 3,082
Source:  Insurance Services Office, Inc., Jersey City, New Jersey
a. The definition of a catastrophe changed in 1996.  Beginning in  1997 the catastrophe definition was
raised from $5 million to $25 million in insured damage.  This change might explain why the number
of recorded catastrophes and the aggregate losses attributed to catastrophes on average is lower than
in earlier years.  The figures for appropriations and outlays in the last two columns are different
because Congress appropriates funds to make it available, but the actual amounts spent could be
different. 
b. Total appropriations into the Disaster Relief Fund.  Figures are in 2002 constant dollars.  The data
in this column comes from: CRS Report RL32242, Emergency Management Funding for the
Department of Homeland Security: Information and Issues for FY 2005, by Keith Bea, p. 8.
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9 CRS Report RL32242, Emergency Management Funding for the Department of Homeland
Security: Information and Issues for FY 2005, by Keith Bea, p.  8.
10 Ibid, p. 7.
11 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Budget, Task Force on Budget Process,
Budgetary Treatment of Emergencies, hearing, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., June 23, 1998
Washington: GPO, 
12 Elliott Mitter, “Alternative National Earthquake Insurance Programs,” Earthquake
Spectrum, August 1991, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 757.
C. These figures, which are in 2002 constant dollars, come from: CRS Report RL32242, Emergency
Management Funding for the Department of Homeland Security: Information and Issues for FY 2005,
by Keith Bea, p. 8.
The last two columns in Table 1 show total appropriations into and outlays from
the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) for federal disaster assistance to help individuals,
families, state an d local governments, and certain nonprofit organizations affected
by severe disasters.  Average annual federal outlays exceeded $3.6 billion since 1995
because of significant hurricanes (Andrew and Inniki FY1992), earthquakes
(Northridge in FY1994), floods (Midwest floods of 1993, Red River Floods of 1995)
the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, and the sequence of four major
hurricanes in 2004.9  For purposes of illustration, prior to FY1989, outlays from the
DRF averaged $568 million, and on only two occasions exceeded $1 billion.10
In this environment of rising cost of federal disaster assistance, the 109th
Congress might focus attention on the long-term budgetary implications of disaster
recovery expenses incurred by the federal government.  The last time Congress took
a critical examination of the federal disaster policy was in 1998.11  This is likely to
occur at the same time that the property insurance industry seeks some type of federal
assistance in reducing their catastrophe exposure.  Ironically, the insurance industry
has historically opposed federal intervention in the insurance marketplace.  But, faced
with new terrorism risk following the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks, and the
recognition of a possible catastrophic hurricane far more devastating than Hurricane
Andrew in 1992, members of the insurance industry have begun to rethink federal
involvement in disaster insurance markets.
Previous Congresses responded to insurer’s concerns about their hazard risk
exposure by considering legislation to create a federal catastrophe reinsurance
program for residential property.12  The first of these proposals — H.R. 4480 and
H.R. 4462 introduced in the 101st Congress — sought to address only the earthquake
hazard.  Later bills, such as H.R. 21 in the 106th Congress and H.R. 1552 in the 108th
Congress, followed an “all-hazard” approach to covering most natural hazards,
including hurricanes and earthquakes.  Both H.R. 21 and H.R. 1552 would have
established a federal program to provide reinsurance to improve the availability of
homeowners’ insurance.  However, the two bills took slightly different approaches.
Whereas H.R. 21 would have provided reinsurance for state disaster insurance
programs, H.R. 1552 would have authorized the Secretary of Treasury to establish
a program to make reinsurance coverage available through the auctioning of contracts
for reinsurance coverage.  Other bills, such as H.R. 4186 in the 108th Congress,
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13 P.L. 107, 297.
14 CRS Report RS21979, Terrorism Risk Insurance: An Overview, by Baird Webel. 
15 Howard Kunreuther and Richard J.  Roth, Sr., Paying the Price: The Status and Role of
Insurance Against Natural Disasters in the United States (Washington: Joseph Henry Press,
1998), p. 92
16 Kunreuther, p. 93.
would have amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow insurers to create
tax-deferred reserves to fund future catastrophe losses from natural disasters.
Despite broad bipartisan support for addressing America’s exposure to natural
disasters, the full Congress did not approve the creation of a federal reinsurance
program until the enactment of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 2002.13
TRIA provides a temporary federal  reinsurance backstop once a high insurance
industry loss is sustained.  The law is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2005.
Two bills — H.R. 1153 and S. 467 — have been introduced in the 109th Congress to
extend the terrorism insurance program.  The insurance industry is seeking to have
TRIA extended for at least two years while the industry continues to work to expand
the private market for terrorism coverage.14
All federal disaster insurance bills, including TRIA, have one thing in common:
they seek to improve the nation’s ability to finance catastrophe risk through insurance
as opposed to increased direct spending for federal disaster assistance.  Their
justification is based on the argument that such initiatives will: (1) enhance the
current catastrophe funding  system; (2) make property insurance more available and
affordable in high-risk areas; (3) promote the funding of research studies (i.e.,
earthquake science, actuarial science, economics, and finance) on disaster insurance
issues; and (4) expand our knowledge and understanding of the scientific and
financial aspects of natural hazards.  Professor Howard Kunreuther at the University
of Pennsylvania has suggested that improvements in the scientific and financial areas
are thought to be important because of the urgency in finding ways to predict the
probability and magnitude of future natural hazards, plan for the necessary funding
for disaster recovery, and devise the optimum allocation of resources after the event
in order to promote speedy economic recovery of the affected region and the
rebuilding of the damaged residential, commercial, and public structures.15
Opponents of federal disaster insurance, however, say such measures conflict
with long-established sociological, economic, and actuarial principles that focus on
the “true”cost of government programs (the opportunity cost of the funds), the
foregone benefits of a competitive insurance marketplace (e.g., cost efficiency and
rate competition), and the absence of consumer choice (the ability to decide whether
to purchase coverage).16  Citing the development of new financial instruments to fund
catastrophe coverage and expanded reinsurance capacity, critics of public insurance
systems say there is no need for a federal insurance program at this time.  They insist
that such programs shield the private sector from loss while creating sizable
taxpayer-financed subsidies that undermine private-sector incentives for efficient risk
management.  Further, it has been argued that these programs encourage population
growth and development in high-risk, hurricane-prone areas that should not be
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17 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) also reported that there
was subtropical storm Nicole and ten tropical depressions.
18 These 12 states are: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina,  Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia. 
19 For more information on the impact of the four hurricanes on Florida see Insurance
Services Office, Inc., Press Release, “AIR Analysis Concludes 2004 Hurricane Season Is
Not As Unusual,” available at [http://www.iso.com/press_releases/2004/11_03_04.html],
visited on March 21, 2005.
developed, and would allow insurers to “cherry pick” the best risks and send the
federal government the poor risks.  Rather than providing insurance protection for
natural hazard losses, critics argue, the federal government should take actions to
expand private-sector capacity for insuring disaster losses. 
Proponents of federal disaster insurance argued that such a scheme would
reduce dependence on “free” disaster assistance and support efficient risk
management by households and businesses.
Atlantic Hurricane Season 2004
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
there were 12 named storms during the 2004 hurricane season, of which nine affected
the United States: three as tropical storms (Bonnie, Hermine and Matthew) and six
as hurricanes (Alex, Charley, Frances, Gaston, Ivan and Jeanne).  Four of the
hurricanes (Charley, Ivan, Frances and Jeanne) made landfall as “major” or Category
3 or higher events on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale.  Three other hurricanes
(Danielle, Karl, and Lisa) did not make landfall.17  The nine named storms that
affected the United States resulted in 21 Presidential declarations of major disaster
covering 12 states, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.18  Florida was affected
the most by the four hurricanes followed by Alabama, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and
North Carolina.19
The 12 named storms during the 2004 hurricane season surpassed the national
average over the past five decades.  According to researchers at Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin, a global actuarial, management, and financial services consulting firm, over
the past 50 years, there have been, on average, 9.8 named storms, 5.8 hurricanes, and
2.3 intense hurricanes.  Not all of these storms made landfall.  The corresponding
figures for 2003 were 16, 7, and 3, respectively.  Some catastrophe risk modeling
firms contend that while the 2004 hurricane season was above normal, it was not so
unusual.  According to their hurricane models, insurers should expect to see four
hurricanes making landfall in the United States approximately once every 12 years
and this is within the range to which most insurers manage their catastrophe risk.  
Tables 2 and 3 show that four of the 2004 major hurricanes — Charley, Jeanne,
Frances, and Ivan — rank among the top ten for both the costliest U.S. hurricanes
and  insured loss events in U.S. history.  For the first time since 1886, three
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20 Matt Brady, “Insurers Post Record First-Half Profits,” National Underwriter: Property
and Casualty, Oct. 25, 2004, p. 32.
hurricanes —  Charley, Frances, and Jeanne — made landfall in the same state —
Florida; Ivan made landfall in Alabama, but continued its path across Florida.20








1 1992 Andrew $15.5 $20.3
2 2004 Charley 7.4 7.4
3 2004 Ivan 6.0 6.0
4 2004 Frances 4.4 4.4
5 1989 Hugo 4.2 6.2
6 2004 Jeanne 3.2 3.2
7 1998 Georges 2.9 3.3
8 1995 Opal 2.1 2.5
9 1999 Floyd 2.0 2.2
10 1992 Iniki 1.6 2.1
Source: Insurance Information Institute, New York, NY.









1 Aug. 1992 Hurricane Andrew $15.5 $20.3
2 Sep. 2001 World Trade Center Terrorist Attack 18.8 19.5
3 Jan. 1994 Northridge, CA Earthquake 12.5 15.5
4 Aug. 2004 Hurricane Charley 6.8 6.8
5 Sep. 1989 Hurricane Ivan 7.1 7.1
6 Sep. 2004 Hurricane Hugo 4.2 6.2
7 Sep. 2004 Hurricane Frances 4.4 4.4
8 Sep. 2004 Hurricane Jeanne 4.6 4.6
9 Sep. 1998 Hurricane Georges 2.9 3.3
10 Jun. 2001 Tropical Storm Allison 2.5 2.6
(1) Adjusted to 2003 dollars by the Insurance Information Institute
(2) Property coverage only.
(3)ISO preliminary estimate, expressed in 2004 dollars  
Source:  Insurance Services Office, Inc., Jersey City, NJ; Insurance Information Institute, New York,
NY.
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21 Forecasters attribute the recent rise in Atlantic basin hurricane activity on long-term
climate patterns, including continuation of warmer-than-normal ocean temperatures across
the tropical Atlantic.  The warmer waters are associated with circulation patterns that form
an above-average hurricane season.
22 “Dangerous Planet: Living on Borrowed Time,” Reaction, July 2004, p. 18.
23 Robert P. Hartwig, Catastrophes: Insurance Issues (Insurance Information Institute:
February 2005), available at [http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/xxx], visited on
Feb. 15, 2004.
24 Swiss Re, 2004.  Excerpts from pre-publication of Swiss Re’s Sigma study, “Natural and
Man-Made Catastrophe 2004,” to be published in Spring 2005.  Data can be found at
[http://Swissre.com], visited on March 16, 2005.
25 See CRS Report RL32581, Assistance After Hurricanes and Other Disasters: FY2004 and
FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations, by Keith Bea and Ralph M. Chite.
26 The number of property/casualty insolvencies in any given year differ based on an
organization’s specific criteria for including a company in the insolvency count.  The
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, for example, list an insurer as insolvent
when a company triggers some formal regulatory action in the calendar year because of
significant financial impairment.    Other organizations like A.M. Best list an insurer as
insolvent when they meet the same criteria, but they count each company in a group.
Meteorological forecasters had correctly predicted above-normal activity during
the 2004 hurricane season,21 based on a trend of above-average activity during seven
of the last nine seasons.  Insurers therefore had knowledge of and presumably were
prepared for these events.  According to climatologists, the level of activities for
2004 was similar to that of 2003, but consumers and insurers were spared huge losses
in 2003 because very few of the tropical storms and hurricanes made landfall in the
United States.22  Thus, insurers faced limited losses from the 2003 hurricane season
in terms of damages relative to their activity, but that was not the case in 2004 when
four major hurricanes made landfall in August and September.  
The Insurance Information Institute in New York estimates that the four major
hurricanes that struck Florida and other Gulf and Atlantic Coast states in 2004 caused
$20.5 billion in wind-related insured losses, and total claims filed of 2.2 million.23
Early estimates suggest that the hurricane will have a total economic price tag of over
$56 billion.24  The four major hurricane, as a whole, exceed the property damages
from the 9/11 terrorist attacks ($19.5 billion) and Hurricane Andrew ($20.3 billion).
In addition to insurance pay-outs, Congress passed two emergency supplemental
appropriations statutes that provided a total of $16.475 billion to hurricane victims.25
Unlike Hurricane Andrew that led to 11 insurer insolvencies and 63 insurers
announcing plans to withdraw from the Florida market or significantly curtailing of
new business, only one small insurer — American Superior Insurance Company —
became insolvent as a direct result of last year’s hurricanes.  The 11 insolvencies
were the largest number of hurricane-related insolvencies in U.S. history.26  Several
insurers did have their financial strength rating downgraded by various rating
agencies, and at least four insurers have started canceling insurance policies in
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27 Paige St. John, “Florida Insurers Start Pulling Out of State,” The Ft. Myers News-Press,
Jan. 7, 2005, p. A1.
28 Theo Francis, “Hurricanes Claim Their First Victim in Insurance Field,” Wall Street
Journal, September 30, 2004, p. B2. 
29 Aaron DeSlatte, “Catastrophe Fund Stirs Debate,” The Florida Today, December 9, 2004,
p. 1. 
30 For more information see, Office of the Florida State Senate Secretary, “Summary of
Legislation Passed: 2004-A Special Session,” available at [http://www.flsenate.gov], visited
on February 16, 2005.
31 It should be noted that $500 hurricane deductibles are still prevalent for homes and mobile
homes valued under $100,000.  
Florida.27  In addition, several insurers have announced that they will no longer seek
new business in the state. 
American Superior Insurance Company wrote homeowners insurance coverage
for nearly 60,000 Floridians and had a premium volume of $34 million, representing
less than 1 percent  of total homeowners insurance premiums collected in Florida.28
The company voluntarily consented to be placed into rehabilitation by the Florida
Department of Financial Services, Division of Rehabilitation and Liquidation.  Under
a plan of receivership, a state-appointed official takes over the company’s operations
and, in the event the insurer cannot be rehabilitated, could liquidate its assets to pay
policyholder’s claims.  If the liquidated assets cannot pay all claims the Florida
Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund will pay the shortfall in claims up
to $300,000, and impose an assessment on all property insurers operating in Florida
to pay claims on behalf of the insolvent insurer.  Insurers, in turn, can write off the
guaranty fund assessments against their state  income taxes, thereby shifting some of
the cost of the insolvency to all taxpayers in the state.
Florida’s Hurricane Deductibles for Residential Insurance
Policies
The requirement that Florida homeowners pay a per-occurrence versus a
seasonal (aggregate) windstorm deductible emerged as an important state legislative
issue following the 2004 hurricane season.29  Some108,000 homeowners were struck
by two or more hurricanes, and approximately 36,000 policies had multiple
deductibles applied and the cost to policyholders of second and subsequent
deductibles may total about $70 million.30  Residential hurricane deductibles are
typically 2% of policy limits and may be as high as 5% of policy limits, or even
higher for certain policies.31  For this reason, the multiple deductible can result in
significant out-of-pocket expense for many policyholders.
On December 16, 2004, the Florida Legislature passed legislation — Hurricane
Deductibles for Residential Insurance Policies (HB 9-A) — that established a
program to reimburse policyholders for financial hardships suffered due to multiple
hurricane deductibles being applied to their insured losses in 2004.  Under HB 9-A,
policyholders of residential property insurance policies who paid two deductibles in
2004 would be eligible for reimbursement from the Department of Financial Services
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up to $10,000 per storm, per policy, per structure, and up to $20,000 if they paid
three or more deductibles.  The law also requires seasonable hurricane deductibles
for all residential policies, effective May 1, 2005.  
The Multiple Deductible Reimbursement Program is funded with $150 million
borrowed from the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (Cat Fund) to reimburse
residential property insurance policyholders .32  The borrowed funds would be repaid
over five years starting in 2006.  The Cat Fund estimates that there will be a
statewide average increase of 0.5% in homeowner rates to cover the payments.33
While insurers were generally pleased with the new law because they will not
have to reopen thousands of already settled claims, they had lobbied to make it easier
for insurers to be reimbursed by the Cat Fund.  Currently, there is a $4.5 billion
threshold trigger before insurers can be reimbursed for losses under the Cat Fund’s
reinsurance agreement.  Florida’s Chief Financial Officer, Tom Gallagher, had
recommended a plan to the Legislature’s Joint Select Committee on Hurricane
Insurance to reduce the Cat Fund retention to $4 billion for each of the two
hurricanes and $1 billion for the third and subsequent events in a season.34
Rate Increases After 2004 Hurricane Season
Some 35 insurers in Florida requested a statewide rate hike following the 2004
hurricane season.  However, Florida’s Insurance Commissioner Kevin McCarty
requested that they hold off on homeowners rate hikes until after the 2005 legislative
session, which began on March 8, 2005.35  According to media reports, property
owners in Florida and other Gulf and Atlantic coast states will likely have to pay 15%
to 20%  more for homeowners and business insurance in 2005.36  Florida’s two
largest property insurers — State Farm and Citizens — received approvals to increase
rates by 5% and 19.3%, respectively.
The key factor in determining how much rates may rise will be the actions of
reinsurance companies.  A key question is whether the losses may have reduced the
capacity of the reinsurance industry to supply coverage.  So far, U.S.-property-
catastrophe reinsurance renewals from accounts affected by Florida hurricane losses
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have seen rates go up by as much as 20%.37  The storms may also result in some
insurers reducing their exposure in areas of severe losses; this could presumably be
accomplished by cutting the amount of coverage offered or increasing deductibles,
possibly forcing the state-sponsored insurance programs to provide coverage in these
areas.
Insurance Lessons Learned from 
Hurricane Andrew
There is little doubt that property insured losses from the 2004  hurricane season
would have been even higher were it not for actions taken by insurers, regulators, and
state legislators to both protect the industry’s balance sheets and stabilize the property
insurance markets in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew in 1992.38  After Andrew,
Florida faced a “capacity gap” — the difference between the amount of capital
(insurance) available and the demand for coverage — and a sudden shortage of
reinsurance for hurricanes.  This situation meant major primary insurers operating in
Florida and other Gulf and Atlantic Coast states could not adequately spread their
catastrophe risks, which, in turn, forced many of them to stop writing new policies
in hurricane-exposed states or to shut down operations altogether for fear of over-
exposure, financial impairment, or even insolvency.  
Insurers were caught off-guard by the large losses associated with Hurricane
Andrew because of significant errors in actuarial estimates of potential hurricane-
related losses.  Prior to Hurricane Hugo in 1989, the insurance industry never
suffered any loss over $1 billion from a single hurricane.  Further, most insurance
industry experts estimated the probable maximum loss (PML) for a single hurricane
in the United States at between $8 and $10 billion, and that such an event would
occur only once in a century.  Hurricane Andrew took insurers and forecasters by
total surprise.  In hindsight, because of the lull in hurricane activity during the 1970s
and 1980s, insurance policies were underpriced and insurers accepted far more
hurricane exposure than could be supported by their capital resources (including
reinsurance). Also, there were deficiencies in the storm-resistant capabilities of
homes in Florida as well as  poor enforcement of building codes in the region. 
In response to post-Andrew insurance market disruption, state insurance
regulators undertook several steps to restrict insurers’ products, pricing, underwriting
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South Florida Building Codes were extended statewide and the state legislature
established the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology to
review hurricane catastrophe models used for rate filings.  These two major changes
were instrumental in defining how insurers process and analyze hurricane risk.
Insurers prospectively evaluated their catastrophe exposures in coastal areas for
the first time and discovered that the magnitude of risk was both unexpectedly high
and unacceptable, given the risk tolerances of management and the expected long-
term return on the business written in hurricane-prone areas in coastal states.40  The
concern was that insurers with excessive catastrophe exposures would have difficulty
achieving or maintaining profitability and balance-sheet strength, and this could lead
to rating downgrades, insurer insolvencies, and insurance availability problems.41
One major outcome of insurers’ assessment of catastrophe risk exposure was
that large national property insurers began forming single-state affiliate insurers to
protect the capital of the holding company.  Also, with the approval of state
regulators, insurers began shifting the risk of windstorm losses away from
overexposed insurers to all property owners and other consumers (through
assessments from state-sponsored pools).  This decision allowed consumers and
insurers to withstand hurricane-related losses in 2004 with limited market disruption
in terms of policy cancellations, non-renewals and insurer insolvencies.42
The economic rationale for shifting the risk of windstorm loss to property
owners through state-sponsored insurance and reinsurance pools was that these pools
have a cost of capital advantage over private insurers.  State-sponsored insurance
pools can offer coverage at a price below what the risk would normally require a
private insurer to charge.  The pooling arrangement works because state insurance
pools can largely avoid the accounting and tax rules governing the private sector.  A
state-sponsored insurance facility is able to defer part of the cost of capital to the
future by virtue of the government’s authority to issue public sector debt to pay
losses, and favorable tax treatment.  But, as economists and financial analysts note,
there are limits to the ability of states to fund/capitalize insurance pools in advance
of catastrophe losses.  That is, many consumers could face unpaid claims. 
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Insurance Market Response to Past Hurricanes
Insurers responded to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 by taking action in four areas:
hurricane insurance deductibles, a capital market for catastrophe securities, building
code regulation and construction standards, and catastrophe modeling and forecasting
tools.  Collectively, these four marketplace changes allowed private insurers,
reinsurers and state-sponsored insurance pools to withstand significant losses from
the 2004 hurricane season, and to continue operating in disaster-prone states.  
Hurricane Insurance Deductibles
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia now require property owners to
pay hurricane or windstorm deductibles from 1% to 15% of the insured value of the
property, depending on the type of home (e.g., mobile homes carry a higher
percentage deductible) and where the property is located, rather than traditional dollar
deductibles used for other types of claims, such as fire damage and theft.43
According to the Insurance Information Institute, the hurricane insurance deductibles
have had the beneficial effects of making insurance coverage more available in high
risk areas, and getting customers more motivated to invest in disaster mitigation, such
as hurricane shutters, damage resistant windows, and homes fortified to withstand
severe storms.44  By imposing a higher deductible for windstorm-related losses,
property owners assume a greater share of the risks associated with living in high risk
areas, and, therefore, they presumably take steps to mitigate potential losses.
Capital Market for Catastrophe Securities
Insurers have traditionally used reinsurance to manage a portion of their
catastrophe risk exposures.  Insurers, reinsurers and an increasing number of
corporations came to the realization beginning in the late-1980s that the  traditional
reinsurance mechanisms were limited in their ability to provide coverage for
catastrophic disasters.45  Recognizing the limits of their ability to finance catastrophe
risk, the high cost of reinsurance  and the sheer size of the capital markets, insurers
and investment banks became more active in offering catastrophe securities which
transfer disaster risk to the capital markets.  Investors are attracted to catastrophe
securities for several reasons, including their above-average risk-adjusted rate of
return versus the typical fixed income instruments and the fact that the rate of return
is not correlated with the returns associated with stock and bond portfolios.
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It was not until 1997 that insurance-linked securities (ILS) gained some
acceptance as catastrophe risk financing alternatives.  As a result, investors in
catastrophe securities continue to demand a high-risk premium because of their lack
of familiarity with catastrophe risk and uncertainty about the likelihood that these
instruments will be triggered.46  The full acceptance of this new asset class for
securitization has been limited by: (1) the tax, cost and regulatory treatment of the
financial instruments — the so-called “special purpose reinsurance vehicles”
(SPRVs)  — underlying the securitization; (2) the lack of standardization in risk
measurements; (3) lack of a generally-accepted index on which to base payouts; and
(4) high transaction costs relative to traditional reinsurance coverage. 
Building Codes and Construction Standards
Disaster risk reduction requires effective enforcement of building codes, land-
use planning, environment risk and human vulnerability monitoring and safety
standards.  In hurricane-prone coastal states like Florida, homeowners insurance rates
are now based on new building code standards and the structure’s ability to withstand
damage by high winds.  In the 1980s, the insurance industry came to the realization
that the level of building code enforcement affected the cost of claims.  It was not
until Hurricane Andrew in 1992, however, that a new organization, the Insurance
Institute for Property Loss Reduction (IIPLR), launched a study to develop better
wind and seismic building codes so structures could better withstand the force of
storms and earthquakes.  The work of the IIPLR led to the development by Insurance
Service Office (ISO) of a building code compliance rating system.  The ISO Building
Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule (BCEGS) assesses the building codes in effect
in a particular community and the community enforcement of these codes.  The
BCEGS takes into account factors such as the size of the community’s building code
enforcement budget relative to the amount of building activity, the professional
qualifications of building inspectors, and past code enforcement levels.  By
incorporating the BCEGS into the underwriting and pricing process, communities
now have the incentive to undertake mitigation activities such as requiring property
owners to use certain roofing material, the installation of hurricane shutters, and the
identification of appropriate load combinations for buildings.  
With the availability of BCEGS, insurers and state insurance regulators
combined forces under the auspices of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) to develop and encourage states to adopt model insurance
laws, regulations and guidelines that link insurance practices to building codes.  The
Florida legislature requires insurers to reflect BCEGS in their rates.  Insurers now
offer discounts on property insurance premiums to property owners and businesses
located in communities with enforced, up-to-date building codes that conform to
BCEGS standards.  Communities with a BCEGS grade of 1 (reflecting exemplary
commitment to building-code enforcement), for example, can demonstrate better loss
experience, resulting in lower insurance premiums.  Insurers may also impose
surcharges in communities where enforcement is lax.  The BCEGS program was
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initially implemented in states with high exposure to wind (hurricane) and seismic
exposure, but now is available throughout the rest of the country.  
Catastrophe Modeling and Insurance Underwriting 
Before Hurricane Andrew in 1992, most insurers had not used electronic
information processing systems to keep track of their potential hurricane loss
exposure and to help them make informed insurance underwriting decisions.47  After
the Andrew disaster there was a widespread use of catastrophe simulation modeling
— a type of modeling that allows insurers and regulators to better predict future
windstorm losses on the basis of current demographics and construction techniques,
rather than historical loss experience.  Actuaries had gained access to sophisticated
statistical databases and computer modeling techniques that could integrate long-term
weather data, engineering studies of storm loss potential, and population trends.48  By
combining mathematical representations of the natural occurrence patterns and
characteristics of hurricanes, tornadoes, severe winter storms, earthquakes, and other
catastrophes, with information on property values, construction types, and occupancy
classes, these computer simulation models provide information concerning the
potential for large disaster losses before they occur.
There are significant limitations to these types of computer modeling
techniques.  For example, loss models work best when they are used to develop a
relative understanding of potential damage rates rather than absolute losses.  Despite
the comparative wealth of data and knowledge about hurricanes and the
sophistication of insured loss models for these events, some experts believe that these
models are often wrong by an order of three, even if all the important event
characteristics are known.  Thus, a model may predict that a given storm will produce
$300 million of insured losses, but the actual insured losses would vary from $100
million to $900 million.
Transferring Risk Through Insurance
Most existing structures in hurricane-prone areas are susceptible to hazard risks,
such as strong winds, storm surges, heavy rains, and flooding.  Insurance as a risk
transfer mechanism can play a key role in helping to minimize disaster losses and
reduce the financial and economic impacts of disasters.  The problem is that multiple-
peril insurance policies held by homeowners exclude damages caused by wind and
water damage.  To fill this gap in coverage, state catastrophe funds, such as the
California Earthquake Authority and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund,
provide coverage for windstorm and earthquake hazards.  In a similar fashion, flood-
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related damages associated with hurricanes may be insured through a separate policy
offered by the federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  
Federal Flood Insurance Program
Property damage from all flooding, not just water damage linked to hurricanes,
totals over $5 billion in the United States each year.49  Insurance against flood hazard
is generally not available in the private insurance market  because only people living
in flood zones could be expected to purchase flood insurance (adverse  selection),
and these people would have frequent claims, thus making the coverage prohibitively
expensive.50  Also, insurers generally lack the ability to spread risk sufficiently to
safeguard their assets against catastrophic flood losses. Therefore, as part of  the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Congress authorized the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP) to serve as an insurance alternative to disaster relief and
to meet the escalating costs of damage to buildings and their contents.51
Prior to 1968, the federal government responded to flooding on a national scale
through the building of flood control structures that restricted the flow of waters (e.g.,
dams, levees, and dikes) and providing disaster relief to flood victims.  After decades
of federal expenditures for structural flood works and expanded disaster relief, the
focus shifted to flood insurance as a policy tool for reducing loss and for spreading
the risk of loss among individuals and businesses.  It was expected that homeowners
and businesses would pre-fund their own losses by purchasing federal flood
insurance.  At the same time, the program would encourage preventive and protective
measures to reduce future losses.  A key mechanism for doing so was the
development of flood plain maps and the requirement that local communities restrict
development in areas most subject to flooding.
The NFIP provides subsidized, low-cost flood insurance to homeowners and
small businesses in flood-prone communities that have agreed to adopt and enforce
floodplain management and building code standards.  Federal flood insurance is
available in each of the 50 States, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, the District
of Columbia, and American Samoa to meet the escalating costs of repairing damage
caused by flood to buildings and contents.  In FY2003, there were 4,543,952 flood
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The NFIP operates under a statutory mandate that premium charges for Pre-
FIRM risks — i.e., structures built before the issuance of a Flood Insurance Rate Map
(FIRM) or before 1975, whichever is later — must be reasonable.  The subsidy is
provided by charging premium rates discounted from full risk rates.  In order to make
up the premium shortfall from subsidizing premiums, the NFIP establishes a target
level of premium income for the program as a whole that accommodates the
combined effect of the portion of NFIP business paying less than full risk premiums
and the portion of the business paying full risk premiums.  
Faced with the growing costs of federal expenditures on flood-related disaster
relief assistance, including insurance claim payments, and the cumulative impact of
low-intensity hurricanes on local economies (in terms of property damage and
subsequent reconstruction activity) Congress has continuously sought to strengthen
the operational and financial aspects of the NFIP.53  Most recently, on June 30, 2004,
President Bush signed legislation to reauthorize the NFIP until September 2008 and
to provide states and local communities with an additional $40 million a year for
mitigating (i.e., buyouts, elevation or move the home) severe repetitive loss
properties  (SRLPs).54
In the absence of federal government intervention into the disaster insurance
market, several states — Florida, California, Hawaii, Louisiana — have had to
address the issue of “uninsurable risks,” meaning risk that cannot get coverage from
private insurers in the “voluntary market.”  States with a high risk of natural disasters
have created catastrophe funds or  residual markets to deal with the unavailability and
unaffordability of property insurance.  The residual market initiatives take on various
forms, such as: (1) Fair Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) Plans that are used
to cover “hard to insure” exposures; (2) Beach & Windstorm Plans that operate by
spreading the risks among insurers operating in the state; (3) Marketing Assistance
Plans (MAP) that address short-term insurance availability and affordability
problems in a state; and (4) provision for the operation of surplus lines.  Both the
property insurance residual markets and catastrophe funds as state-sponsored loss-
sharing mechanisms will be discussed in the next section.
State-Sponsored Lost-Sharing Mechanisms
In states where insurers in the private market have reached the limits of their
willingness or ability to provide coverage for homes and businesses in high risk
areas, the state has created catastrophe funds and property residual insurance markets
( i.e., Fair Plan and Beach & Windstorm Plans), marketing assistance plans, and
provisions for surplus line operations that serve to stabilize the property insurance
market — without the involvement of the federal government.  Following is a brief
discussion of these state residual insurance markets.
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Fair Plans.  The District of Columbia and 34 states have Fair Access to
Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plans that make property insurance available to
applicants on eligible property located in coastal areas who have been unable to
secure such insurance in the normal insurance market.  FAIR Plans are syndicated
associations of property insurers doing business under the auspices of the state
insurance regulator.  Although the FAIR Plans act as a single insurer, participating
companies actually share on a pro rata basis all of the premiums as well as the profits
or losses and expenses incurred.  
The concept for FAIR Plans emerged in response to urban riots and civil
disorder in the 1960s and the withdrawal of insurers from the property insurance
market in communities with a high potential for loss.  Congress enacted the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 196855 which sought to ensure the availability and
affordability of fire, crime, and other property insurance in high-risk urban areas by
offering federal riot reinsurance to property insurance companies operating in states
that voluntarily adopted a FAIR Plan.56
Beach and Windstorm Insurance Plans.  In 1969, following Hurricane
Camille, the first Coastal or “Beach” Pool was created to address the shortage of
windstorm insurance in areas vulnerable to hurricane losses.  Today, nine states have
formed Beach and Windstorm Plans which provide coverage for the wind peril alone
in designated risk-prone coastal areas.57  In some states the FAIR Plan serves as the
windstorm plan.  Under a state-sponsored windstorm pool, the wind coverage is
isolated, and a separate policy is issued for this peril by the private insurer.
Windstorm pools typically purchase reinsurance to cover future losses.
Florida’s Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.  On July 1, 2002,
the Florida Legislature passed a law that created the Citizens Property Insurance
Corporation (Citizens) as a market of last resort for residential and commercial
residential58 coverages in high-risk areas where the property owner is unable to
procure insurance in the open, private insurance market.59  Citizens was created with
the merger of the two existing property residual markets: Florida Residential Property
and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association (FRPCJUA) and the Florida Windstorm
Underwriting Association (FWUA).  
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Citizens operates under the authority of a seven-member Board of Governors,
approved by the State Treasurer.  The State Treasurer also appoints a technical
advisory Board of Governors to provide information and advice to the seven-member
Board of Governors.  All revenues, assets, liabilities, losses, and expenses of Citizens
are divided into three separate accounts: (1) a personal lines account for personal
residential polices issued by Citizens or the FRPCJUA, and renewed by Citizens ,that
provides comprehensive, multi-peril coverage on risks which are not located in areas
eligible for coverage in the FWUA (and for such policies that do not provide
coverage for the peril of wind); (2) a commercial lines account for commercial
residential policies; and (3) a high-risk account for personal residential policies and
commercial residential and commercial non-residential property policies.
Citizens is authorized by statute to issue bonds and impose emergency
assessments on all licensed property insurers in the state.  For the most part, these
assessments are eventually passed onto consumers.  In order to maximize the
financial resources to pay claims following a catastrophic hurricane, Citizen’s income
and the interest on the debt obligations issued by the corporation are exempt from
federal income taxation. 
Although the presence of Citizens in the market has stabilized the availability
and pricing of insurance in coastal areas of Florida, legislators and regulators have
concerns about the growth in the number of policies issued during the past few years
as well as the fact that all insurance customers statewide are responsible for a
significant deficit.60
Florida’s insurance commissioner placed Citizens on a “watch list” during the
2004 hurricane season in an effort to ensure the insurer had sufficient reserves to pay
claims.  According to preliminary reports released by Citizens, and filed with the
Florida Senate Banking and Insurance Committee, the insurer is projected to have a
$393.1 million deficit in its “high-risk” account, which covers only wind damage.
This shortfall could cost the state’s homeowners an additional $50 to $55 per $1,000
of premium.61  In addition, although Citizens buys reinsurance protection from the
Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund to cover some of its losses, given the current
structure of the Cat Fund the insurer could not be reimbursed until losses from a
single storm surpasses $1 billion.  None of Citizen’s wind-damage losses from any
of the four hurricanes in 2004 exceeded that level.  Overall, Citizens had a $1.8
billion surplus in its three separate accounts when the 2004 hurricane season began.
The High Risk Account, which is not in deficit, began the hurricane season with
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projected reserves of $1.1 billion.62  The Personal and Commercial Line Accounts
currently have sufficient surplus: $600 million and $100 million, respectively.63
Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.  In 1993, the Florida Legislature
created the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund — “Cat Fund” — in response to
insurers’ concerns about actual and threatened catastrophic losses to property in the
state from hurricanes, and their unwillingness or inability to provide property
insurance coverage to the extent sought and needed.  The Cat Fund was therefore
established as a tax-exempt source of reimbursement to property insurers for a
selected percentage of hurricane losses above the insurer’s retention (deductible).
The reinsurance provided by the Cat Fund is designed to stabilize the residential
property insurance market in the event of a major hurricane by offering relatively
inexpensive reinsurance to property insurers and the state’s insurers of last resort —
Citizens.  The cost of this reinsurance is below what the private reinsurance market
charges because the Cat Fund is not only exempt from federal income tax, but also
the state’s income tax and premium tax. The Cat Fund was the first program in the
United States in which a state provided for tax-exempt accumulation of private cash
to pay for major disasters.  The relatively inexpensive reinsurance sold by the Cat
Fund to Citizens (and other residential property insurers) allows them to write more
residential property insurance in the state — than otherwise would be the case — and
also acts to lower premiums for consumers.
On June 1, 2004, the Florida Legislature expanded the overall claims paying
capacity of the Cat Fund from $11 billion to $15 billion.  The $15 billion amount is
financed primarily through reinsurance premiums paid by primary insurers (based on
their exposure to hurricane losses) and investment income.64  Retained earnings are
held in a reserve fund account that accumulates, along with investment earnings, on
a tax-free basis.  In the event cash reserves are insufficient to pay claims, the Cat
Fund could issue state government revenue bonds or other debt instruments to raise
billion of dollars for claims payout.  
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Under the Cat Fund’s reinsurance arrangement, private insurers and Citizens
are reimbursed for as much as 90 percent of insured hurricane losses in excess of a
$4.5 billion per storm deductible, up to a total of $15 billion each year.  Insurers can
choose from three reimbursement coverage options — 45 percent of losses over the
retention, 75 percent or 90 percent — depending on their risk tolerance levels and
how much they want to pay for reinsurance.  The $4.5 billion is an industry
deductible.  Each insurer has an individual deductible, which is its proportionate
share of the $4.5 billion industry aggregate.  This individual insurer deductible allows
smaller insurers that suffer unusually heavy losses to qualify for reimbursement,
while the industry overall might not.  Insurers also have an individual maximum
coverage which is their individual share of the $15 billion maximum industry
aggregate collected by the Cat Fund.  Insured losses above $15 billion would be
covered by the insurer’s high layer reinsurance and their surplus or reserves.
The Cat Fund had a cash balance of $5.6 billion before the 2004 hurricane
season, and is currently at $6.15 billion in cash reserves.  As indicated above, if it
were necessary, the difference between the $6.15 billion and the $15 billion (or $8.85
billion) aggregate claims-paying capacity will be financed through revenue bonds or
other debt from the major financial markets.  The bonds will be financed with
assessments on all property and casualty premiums throughout the state, except
workers’ compensation and medical malpractice insurance premiums.  Because the
Cat Fund will have an estimated $6.15 billion in claims paying capacity at the end
of the year against $2 billion in projected payouts from the 2004 hurricane season,
there will not be bonding and statewide assessment.65  The Cat Fund has been
activated only twice, each time in 1995.  It paid $13.1 million for Hurricane Opal and
$47,672 for Hurricane Erin.  The largest participants in the Cat Fund are Citizens,
State Farm, Allstate, USAA, Nationwide and Chubb.
Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.  On January 1,
2004, the Louisiana legislature merged the Louisiana Joint Reinsurance Plan (FAIR
Plan) and the Louisiana Insurance Underwriting Plan (Beach and Windstorm Plan)
to create the Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation as an insurer of last
resort for property owners unable to obtain insurance in the state.  Policies in force
at the time of the merger were to be handled by their respective plans.  New
insurance business is being placed with Louisiana’s Citizen.  This new entity can
build up reserve funds on a tax-free basis to pay claims after a natural disaster.  In the
event the fund falls short, the state can issue revenue bonds to pay claims.  Private
insurers are responsible for retiring the bonds, but can pass on the costs to
policyholders in the form of a surcharge. 
Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund.  After Hurricane Iniki struck in 1992, the
Hawaii legislature created a Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund (HHRF) to provide
windstorm coverage for residential properties in Hawaii.  Under the state-sponsored
insurance scheme, insurers are allowed to sell homeowners insurance with a
hurricane exclusion.  Each participating insurer in the state then acts as a servicing
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insurer for the HHRF, issuing the insured a separate hurricane policy and collecting
a separate premium that is then forwarded to the HHRF.  
The HHRF receives ongoing revenue from hurricane premiums, and insurance
companies post-hurricane assessments on property business and mortgage recording
fees.  The plan provides coverage for losses up to approximately $2 billion in
residential damages from hurricanes.  Homeowners are responsible for the first 10%
in losses from a major hurricane.  Private insurers participating in the HHRF would
be responsible for the next loss layer after the insured’s deductible.  The Fund uses
some of the hurricane premium revenues to buy reinsurance, which covers the third
loss layer.  The last layer of coverage comes from lines of credit, which are secured
by future surcharges on all property and casualty premiums.  If losses exceed the total
coverage amounts, claims are paid on a pro-rata basis.
Market Assistance Plans (MAP).  Four states — Florida, New York, New
Jersey, and Texas — have established Marketing Assistance Plans (MAPs) as service
organizations designed to assist consumers in obtaining property and casualty
insurance coverage from authorized insurers in the private market. These
organizations are voluntary mechanisms coordinated by private insures and agent
groups in cooperation with the state insurance regulators to provide insurance when
there is a “temporary” market failure.  The MAPS collect and maintain information
on agents and insurers writing certain coverages.
MAPS are typically administered by insurance agents’ associations that will
assign  insurance applicants who are declined coverage in the voluntary market to
participating insurers that agree to accept applicants on a proportional market-share
basis.  Some states have created “Property Protection Programs” in conjunction with
MAPs to provide insurers with financial incentives (e.g., state premium tax credits)
to underwrite basic residential insurance coverages which can be tailored to fit the
specific needs of residents in a particular community exposed to catastrophe risk.
Surplus Lines Insurance
Any risk for which insurance is not available through a company licensed in the
applicant’s state (an “admitted” insurer) may be covered by a surplus lines insurer.
The business is placed with a “non-admitted” insurer in accordance with surplus or
excess lines provision of state insurance laws.  Regulators allow catastrophe
insurance or “hard-to-place” coverage such as insurance for antique cars to be sold
in a less regulated environment on a surplus lines basis because of the unusual nature
of the  risks, and the need for  greater flexibility in policy terms and pricing.  Also,
coverage may be offered on a surplus lines basis if the voluntary or involuntary
markets will not write expensive  homes in a high-risk community.
Challenges for the 109th Congress and Beyond 
In 2005, despite the ability to better predict and manage individual insurance
company hurricane exposures, the property insurance industry, as a whole, still faces
the long-term challenge of maintaining viable insurance markets after a catastrophic
CRS-24
66 Rude T. Musulin, “Would a Federal Role in Disaster Protection Be a Catastrophe?”
Contingencies, November 29, 2003, p. 28.
67 Conning & Company, Lighting Candles in the Wind: Industry Response to the
Catastrophe Problem.  Hartford, Connecticut. November 1994, p. 27.
68 Ibid.
69 The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 required that FEMA submit a report
evaluating the economic impact of erosion on coastal communities and the NFIP.  The
study, which was written by the Heinz Center, recommended that FEMA develop maps that
identify coastal erosion hazard areas and include the cost of expected erosion losses when
setting flood insurance rates for coastal areas.
hurricane strikes.  Complicating this challenge is the recognition that America is
increasingly vulnerable to hurricane damages as a result of three major ongoing
developments: (1) rapid expansion of the U.S. population into areas that are
susceptible to natural disasters; (2) rising property values in coastal areas; and (3)
climatological and environmental changes. 
Population Growth and Coastal Development
With a significant percentage of our population now living in hurricane-exposed
areas, even larger insured property losses from hurricanes are possible.66  The
American population is migrating toward the coasts at a rapid rate, placing people
and property investments at risk of loss.  In the last three decades, the nation’s
shorelines have come under increasing pressure from population growth and
development, and this has profound consequences for the insurance industry (through
higher losses) and the federal budget (through emergency supplemental
appropriations).  As an illustration, according to the 2000 U.S. Census data, 55% of
the U.S. population live within 50 miles of a coastline (including Great Lakes
shorelines).  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reports
that the population density per square mile in hurricane-prone Southeast coastal areas
increased 129%, versus 38% in the total U.S., during the 30-year period from 1960
to 1990.67  The Insurance Services Office (ISO) found that from 1970 to 1990, the
Southeast Atlantic Coast had a nearly 75% increase in population density, far
surpassing the countrywide increase of more than 20%.68
Given this trend in population growth and coastal development, policymakers
have become increasingly aware of the erosion risks facing homeowners and
communities due to high intensity storms and coastal flooding.69  It is not uncommon,
for example, for a hurricane or severe coastal storm to cause the coast to erode 100
feet or more in a single day.  This situation has led to debate over the economic
consequences of erosion and the use of federal programs, such as the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), to address the coastal erosion problem.  The principal
concern is that while the NFIP covers erosion damage that occurs in connection with
floods, it does not account for erosion in setting flood insurance rates in coastal areas.
The insurance industry and FEMA have both taken steps to address coastal
erosion.  Insurers responded to coastal erosion risk by making policyholders
vulnerable to windstorms pay more of the cost of living in hurricane prone areas.  For
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example, insurers now impose hurricane deductibles equal to a percentage of the
structure’s insured value and establish rates for windstorm coverage based on the
structure’s ability to withstand damage from high wind.  FEMA has begun to prepare
and disseminate maps showing areas subject to erosion, created and imposed a
mandatory surcharge for erosion on flood insurance in Coastal High Hazard Zones,
and, with the passage of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, provided
relocation assistance and/or buyouts.70
The National Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP) is a federal-state
partnership authorized by the Coastal Zone Management Act71 to encourage coastal
states to develop and implement coastal zone management plans.  Some 34 states and
territories participate in the CZMP.72  The CZMP is designed to encourage the states
to work with the federal government in finding a balance between protecting the
coast and preserving the human uses that depend on the environment.  The CZMP
supports states through financial assistance and technical services and information.
In addition, the NFIP is managed in a manner that is consistent with the criteria and
standards established for the federally approved state coastal zone management plans.
Rising Property Values in Coastal Areas
Along with rising coastal population growth, there has been a tendency for
coastal development to consist of relatively more expensive properties.73  According
to Dean John Dutton of Pennsylvania State University and the National Oceanic
Administration Agency (NOAA), up to $2.2 trillion of the U.S. economy are believed
to be affected annually by weather and climate events.74   Whether provided by an
insurer’s surplus, reinsurance agreements, or securitized insurance instruments,
capital is needed to underwrite property insurance covering potential losses from
weather and climate events.
After Andrew, it became obvious that exposures in disaster-prone areas were
far beyond the capital that was available from existing sources before the event.
Insurers have responded to this situation with reforms of insurance systems.  They
have also played an active role in encouraging the development of better wind and
seismic building codes so future construction could better withstand the force of
hurricanes and earthquakes.  It takes time, however, to implement and realize the
results of construction standards nationwide.  Because most of the building in coastal
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areas were constructed in the 1970 through 1990 period, when these building
standards did not apply, most homes remain vulnerable to damages from natural
disasters.  In addition, insurers have shifted more responsibility for catastrophe
damages to the property owners.  They have accomplished this by requiring higher
deductibles and employing computer-generated rates — rates which are based on a
simulation of various scenarios involving a structure’s ability to withstand damage
by high winds and from water damage.
Climatological and Environmental Changes
There is a growing body of scientific evidence suggesting that the global climate
may be changing (i.e. global warming), with more frequent extreme weather events
occurring, thereby increasing the incidence and severity of natural disasters such as
hurricanes and floods.75  At the core of the global warming debate is the belief that
human-derived so-called “greenhouse gases” emissions have risen in recent decades,
resulting in a dramatic rise in both the temperature at the earth’s surface and the
frequency and severity of hurricanes, windstorms and floods.
The basic assumptions underpinning the pricing of insurance against hurricanes
does not take into account changes in the global climate.  Moreover, insurers
traditionally assume that the average insured losses over a recent historical period
accurately reflect future losses over some arbitrary future period.  This assumption
works well with automobile insurance and other widely distributed, independent risk,
but is less appropriate for low-frequency/high consequence events like hurricanes.
In other words, the average activity in any arbitrary period of the past is not
necessarily a good predictor of future activity.  The inability to predict future
disasters will impact the capacity for disaster financing as part of a comprehensive
disaster management approach.
Issues and Policy Options
A central issue that faces Members of the 109th Congress is determining whether
there is a need to improve the nation’s ability to finance catastrophe risk and, if so,
how.  In other words, more specifically, Congress may wish to determine what are
the appropriate roles and policies of the public and private sectors to  address
hurricane risk, how they affect hurricane risk, and how they might be restructured to
better achieve social objectives.
Three points of view usually emerge when debating the catastrophe funding
problem.  One view is that catastrophes (e.g., hurricanes) are “uninsurable” in the
private sector and the federal government should directly take over underwriting
insurance.  This view is not widely supported because the private sector has access
to capital market resources that can be used to fund the cost of a catastrophic
hurricane.
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A second point of view argues that some form of federal involvement is needed
before a really “big” event occurs.76  A consensus among insurance and public policy
experts seems to have emerged that a public-private partnership in financing a
mega-catastrophe might eventually be needed.  Such a partnership would leave the
private sector responsible for underwriting property insurance, and the federal
government responsible for providing capital only where consumers and the private
insurance and capital markets are unable to do so.   The government could facilitate
more effective risk-spreading, which can be achieved by more effective pooling of
losses over time and broader pooling of losses among risks.  A more effective
pooling of losses over time could be achieved by borrowing mechanisms and tax
deferral of loss reserves for natural disasters.  Broader pooling of losses among risks
could be facilitated by requiring property owners to purchase insurance against
natural hazards.  Economists note, however, that any scheme that imposes a
mandatory insurance requirement for all property owners could create economic
distortions, such as cross subsidization of risks, where low risk individuals subsidize
high risk individuals.
A third point of view presupposes that  the financial resources available in the
private sector are sufficient to make federal involvement unnecessary at this time. 
Members of the 109th Congress could pursue any one or all of the following
policy options if it could be shown that potential losses from hurricane hazards are
beyond the capacity of private markets to diversify disaster risks.
! establish an emergency reserve fund to provide timely financial
assistance in response to domestic disasters and emergencies, the
approach advocated in S. 24, Emergency Reserve Fund of 2005,
introduced on January 24, 2005, in the 109th Congress;
! provide financial backstop or guarantees to innovative financial
instruments and activities involving insurance interstate compacts
between states set up to address regional exposure to catastrophic
losses involving hurricanes in the Gulf and Atlantic coast states, and
earthquakes in the Pacific northwest states and other areas exposed
to similar hazard risks;
! develop a large regional pool for hurricane insurance with potential
benefits of spreading the risks across impacted states.  Currently,
each state relies on its own financial resources to develop a
substantial pool of funds for insurance.  Some supporters of this
policy option have even suggested pooling risks with the same
characteristics as hurricanes, such as earthquakes, volcanos, and
tsunamis, into a single national hazard insurance program designed
to solve the catastrophe funding problem;
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! establish a federal hurricane program to provide reinsurance to state-
sponsored insurance programs;
! establish an explicit federal windstorm insurance program, similar
to the National Flood Insurance Program;
! focus on tax policy to allow insurers to create tax-deferred reserves
to fund future catastrophe losses from natural disasters; 
! encourage innovative new financing mechanisms of insurance,
reinsurance and capital markets to mitigate and diversify disaster
risk;
! establish effective warning systems similar to that offered in S. 50,
Tsunami Preparedness Act of 2005, introduced on January 24, 2005,
in the 109th Congress;
! implement a comprehensive national disaster mitigation policy
strategy for reducing future losses. 
These approaches have been debated in previous Congresses and some have
enjoyed bipartisan support; however, no consensus emerged, largely because of
concerns that such approaches would: (1) encourage home construction in high-risk
areas; (2) serve as a tax giveaway to rich insurers; (3) expose the federal treasury to
large contingent costs at a time of budgetary deficits; or (4) give a competitive
advantage to certain segments of the insurance industry. 
Conclusion
The four major hurricanes that made landfall in 2004 illustrate both the
destructive nature of hurricanes, and the importance of insurance as a major financial
source for post-disaster economic recovery.  Although insurers are expected to easily
cover the $20.5 billion in insured losses from the 2004 hurricanes, many questions
have been raised about their continued willingness and ability to sell property
insurance coverage in hurricane-prone states.  The reason for these questions is that,
as development increased in coastal areas, a catastrophic hurricane could result in
huge government outlays for disaster assistance and present insurers with significant
financial hazards, such as the risk of insolvency, a rapid reduction of earnings and
statutory surplus, forced asset liquidation to meet cash needs, and ratings downgrade.
To the extent property insurance markets fail to offer adequate levels of
coverage after a catastrophic hurricane, and the federal government avoids the
disaster insurance market (with the exception of terrorism risk insurance), the states
will likely continue to offer various, loss-sharing mechanisms that provide
catastrophe insurance or reinsurance coverage at subsidized rates.  In a similar
manner, the federal government will continue to offer flood insurance under the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to offset repair and rebuilding costs in
flood-prone regions.  
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Members of the 109th Congress will likely be called upon to determine whether
there is a need to improve the nation’s ability to finance catastrophe risk and, if so,
how.  Previous Congresses responded to similar concerns by considering legislation
to create a federal catastrophe reinsurance program for residential property.  But,
despite broad support for several bills over the past few Congresses, the full Congress
did not authorize a federal reinsurance program until the enactment of the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002.  
Finally, most observers would agree that for the very highest layers of
catastrophe risk, the government (and consequently the taxpayer) is now, by default,
the insurer of last resort.  In the 109th Congress, any one of a number of policy
options could be pursued, but passage will likely be based on whether it can be
shown that potential losses from hurricane hazards are beyond the capacity of private
markets to diversify natural hazard risks.  Members will likely be grappling with
several policy questions.  For example, will reinsurance and securitization be enough
to maintain insurance solvency after a catastrophic hurricane? How can the various
funding sources available for catastrophe insurance be expanded and refined to cope
with a catastrophic hurricane?  And lastly, what role, if any, should the federal
government play in catastrophe insurance?
